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1 
“THE MARVELS OF MODERN 
TECHNOLOGY”: CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, TECHNOLOGY, AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION COLLIDE IN UNITED 
STATES v. CHIARADIO 
Wilber A. Barillas* 
Abstract: On July 11, 2012, in United States v. Chiaradio, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held that a defendant possessing child por-
nography on two networked computers had committed two separate 
crimes of possession and distribution of child pornography under 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The court, however, should have shown restraint 
in its analysis to avoid creating dangerous precedent. In her concurring 
opinion, Chief Judge Lynch argued for a narrow holding, emphasizing 
the statute’s ambiguity as applied to more complex, modern scenarios. 
The First Circuit’s decision highlights how courts struggle to apply older 
statutes to rapidly evolving technology. The legislature is in the best posi-
tion to strike the ideal balance between the constitutional rights of the 
accused and protecting the public. A deferential judicial opinion by the 
First Circuit in Chiaradio would have been a powerful message to Congress 
of the ambiguity of section 2552(a)(4)(B). 
Introduction 
 David Chiaradio was charged in federal district court for two sepa-
rate counts of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(a)(4)(B) after FBI agents discovered child pornography on two 
computers in his home.1 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island found Chiaradio guilty of two separate counts of posses-
sion and distribution of child pornography.2 Chiaradio appealed the 
district court’s decision, arguing that the ruling was a violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states that a 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006) (stating that individuals can be charged under the 
statute if they “knowingly possess[] . . . 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, 
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction” of child pornography); 
United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 272 (1st Cir. 2012). 
2 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 272. 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
citizen cannot be punished multiple times for the same crime.3 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the case, finding 
that Congress intended for an individual in Chiaradio’s position to be 
charged with a single crime.4 In her concurring opinion, Chief Judge 
Lynch expressed concern over the manner in which the majority 
reached this conclusion.5 Specifically, Chief Judge Lynch urged a nar-
row reading of the case because the Congressional intent behind the 
statute could not be deciphered adequately by looking at the statutory 
text.6 Furthermore, Chief Judge Lynch was concerned that setting any 
sort of precedent beyond the facts of the case could have detrimental 
consequences.7 The Chief Judge seemed to be aware of the coming 
changes in technology and how files will no longer be kept in a single 
hard drive on a single computer.8 
 Chiaradio’s case highlights the dangers of leaving courts to decide 
how new technology applies to older and unclear statutes.9 On one 
hand, a court may take an overzealous approach and possibly violate or 
imperil the constitutional rights of the accused.10 On the other hand, a 
court may misconstrue the severity of the crime and thereby fail to 
safeguard the public adequately.11 Striking the ideal balance between 
the constitutional rights of the accused and protecting the public is a 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id.; see U.S. Const. amend. V (stating that no person shall “be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 
(1980) (stating that the Fifth Amendment “protects against multiple punishments for the 
same offense”). 
4 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 276, 284 (stating that “on the facts of this case, the defen-
dant’s unlawful possession of a multitude of files on two interlinked computers located in 
separate rooms within the same dwelling gave rise to only a single count of unlawful pos-
session under section 2252(a)(4)(B)”). The First Circuit stated that remanding the case 
was the most “salubrious” course of action. Id. at 284. 
5 See id. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Lynch especially did not like the 
fact that the First Circuit looked to United States v. Polouizzi for guidance in deciding the 
case. See id.; United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 153–57 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
an individual charged with eleven counts of possessing child pornography for possessing 
thousands of illegal images across three hard drives in two separate rooms had committed 
a single crime). 
6 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id.; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Case for 
Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 875–82 (2004) (stating the logistical hurdles faced by the 
judicial branch when trying to adapt to new technology). 
10 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring); Kerr, supra note 9, at 875–
82. 
11 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring); Kerr, supra note 9, at 875–
82. 
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task that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is best equipped to 
handle.12 
I. The FBI’s Investigation and Indictment of Chiaradio 
 On February 28, 2006, FBI agent Joseph Cecchini went online to 
search for distributors of child pornography.13 Agent Cecchini used a 
special version of the file sharing software LimeWire that had been cus-
tomized to assist child pornography investigations.14 This special ver-
sion of LimeWire allowed FBI agents to determine the precise street 
address of the individual from whom they were downloading the illegal 
files.15 Agent Cecchini downloaded three files from a single source after 
searching for “pedo collection,” and the software pinpointed the files as 
originating from an address in Westerly, Rhode Island.16 Agent Cec-
chini relayed this information to agent Andrew Yesnowski, who was 
tasked with executing the search warrant.17 
 On August 22, 2006, Agent Yesnowski and a search party executed 
the search warrant at the Westerly residence.18 The agent discovered two 
computers—a laptop and desktop—in separate rooms of the house.19 
Chiaradio, who was home at the time, admitted to the agents that the 
computers were networked in a way that allowed for the wireless sharing 
of files.20 Chiaradio stated that he had never searched for, distributed, or 
downloaded child pornography.21 Nevertheless, the agents discovered 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Kerr, supra note 9, at 875–82. 
13 United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 271 (1st Cir. 2012). 
14 Id.; see Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265 (1st 
Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Brief for the U.S.]. 
15 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 271; Brief for the U.S., supra note 14, at 8 (stating that the cus-
tomized FBI software “also displays the geographical location and Internet service provider 
associated with the IP address”). 
16 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 271. Specifically, the software allows the FBI to obtain the sus-
pect’s IP address and Internet service provider and, once armed with that information, it 
is a simple matter of contacting the provider to obtain the address of the home from which 
the IP address originated. Brief for the U.S., supra note 14, at 8–9. 
17 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 271. 
18 Id.; see Brief of Defendant-Appellant David Chiaradio at 4, United States v. Chiara-
dio, 684 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Brief for the Defendant]. 
19 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 271. 
20 Id. Chiaradio had apparently set up the file sharing between the computers himself, 
which indicated to the authorities that Chiaradio was fairly computer literate and con-
sciously sought out a system that allowed easy sharing of images between his laptop and 
desktop. See Brief for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 4. 
21 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 271–72. In fact, Chiaradio denied that he had ever seen the 
folder that contained the illegal images in question, even though the folder “was con-
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seven thousand images and videos of child pornography on the com-
puters.22 Many of the images overlapped on the two computers, and 
Chiaradio later admitted to using the laptop as his primary download 
computer and the desktop as his archive and “sharing” computer, a 
function facilitated by the wireless network configuration.23 
 On May 20, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Chiaradio with two 
counts of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 
(a)(4)(B) and one count of distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).24 
A jury subsequently found Chiaradio guilty of both counts of posses-
sion—the first count of possession was for the desktop, and the second 
count of possession was for the laptop—of child pornography under 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).25 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island did not disturb the jury’s decision and sentenced Chiara-
dio on two separate counts of possession of child pornography.26 
Chiaradio promptly appealed the district court’s decision, stating that 
the district court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment by convicting him twice for the same crime.27 
                                                                                                                      
spicuously present on the laptop computer’s start-up screen.” Brief for the U.S., supra note 
14, at 10–11. 
22 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 272. 
23 Id.; Brief for the U.S., supra note 14, at 70. According to the FBI agents, Chiaradio’s 
laptop was in the middle of downloading additional illegal images when they entered his 
home. Brief for the U.S., supra note 14, at 10. 
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (4) (2006); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 272. The federal grand 
jury found Chiaradio guilty of every charge that the government brought against him. 
Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 272. 
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 272. Section 2252(a)(4)(B) 
forbids “knowingly possess[ing] . . . 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video 
tapes, or other matter” depicting child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The gov-
ernment’s winning argument with the district court appears to have centered around 
United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2000), and United States v. Lacy, 119 
F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1997), which together state that a computer hard drive is a “matter” 
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). See Brief for the U.S., supra note 14, at 53–56. 
The fact that Chiaradio possessed two separate “matters” containing child pornography 
(i.e., two separate hard drives) meant that he could be charged with two separate crimes 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). See id. 
26 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 272. 
27 See id.; Brief for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 44–46 (arguing that the district 
court’s ruling was inconsistent with a prior circuit court ruling in United States v. Polouizzi, 
and that, in the alternative, two networked hard drives were mere gateways to the single 
electronic database that was the real “matter” intended by the statute). 
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II. The First Circuit Considers Legislative Intent and Stare 
Decisis 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned the dis-
trict court’s ruling convicting Chiaradio of two separate counts of pos-
session of child pornography.28 The First Circuit held that Chiaradio was 
unconstitutionally charged twice for the same crime.29 The First Circuit 
based its decision on two premises.30 First, the legislative intent behind 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) indicates that someone in Chiaradio’s posi-
tion should be charged with only one count of possession.31 Second, 
Chiaradio’s case was similar to United States v. Polouizzi, where the Second 
Circuit held that a defendant who had numerous illegal files across 
three non-networked hard drives committed a single crime.32 
 The First Circuit looked to the history of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) 
for guidance, but did not find any explicit indication by Congress that 
section 2252(a)(4)(B) can be used to charge an individual with multiple 
crimes based on the number of “matters” used to house the illegal im-
ages.33 The court focused on the “one or more” language of the statute 
because it was different from other statutes that previously had been used 
to charge a defendant with multiple offenses based on the number of 
items he possessed.34 To emphasize this point, the court distinguished 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)—which deals with the possession and distribu-
tion of illegal images involving minors—from 18 U.S.C. § 2252A 
(a)(5)(B)—which deals with the possession and distribution of child 
                                                                                                                      
28 United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 276 (1st Cir. 2012). 
29 Id. The First Circuit explicitly stated, “[Chiaradio’s] simultaneous convictions and 
sentences on those counts violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeop-
ardy.” Id. 
30 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 273–75. 
31 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 273–75. 
32 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275; United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 147, 157 (2d 
Cir. 2009). 
33 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 273–74. The text of the statute 
uses the word “matter” as an ambiguous catchall. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (stating “1 
or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter”) (emphasis 
added); Brief for the U.S., supra note 14, at 55 (“The term ‘matter’ means ‘physical media’ 
capable of containing images . . . which includes a computer hard drive.”). The Act was 
passed in 1990 and amended in 1998. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274. 
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274. The court found it note-
worthy that no other section of the statute contains a numerical indicator. Chiaradio, 684 
F.3d at 274. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) through (a)(3) deal with receipt, distri-
bution, and sale offenses, but each clause uses the word “any” as opposed to the phrase 
“one or more.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(3); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274. 
6 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
pornography.35 The First Circuit noted that § 2252A(a)(5)(B) allows for 
multiple offenses depending on the number of possessions because its 
language states that an individual can be charged for possessing “any” 
illegal matter.36 This is different from the language in section 
2252(a)(4)(B), which says that an individual may be charged if he pos-
sesses “one or more” illegal matters.37 The court concluded that if Con-
gress truly wanted to allow multiple prosecutions under section 2252 
(a)(4)(B), then Congress would have used the same language it used in 
section 2252A(a)(5)(B).38 
 For guidance, the First Circuit in Chiaradio also looked to decisions 
by sister circuits that had previously interpreted 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B)—United States v. Kimbrough and United States v. Pol-
ouizzi.39 In Kimbrough, the defendant appealed after he received multi-
ple counts of possession under section 2252(a)(4)(B) due to multiple 
illegal images that he housed in a single computer.40 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plain language of section 
2252(a)(4)(B) indicates that Congress did not intend for the statute to 
be used to charge multiple offenses based on the number of illegal im-
ages.41 Because its own independent analysis of the statute reached the 
same conclusion, the First Circuit in Chiaradio found Kimbrough’s analy-
sis and conclusion particularly persuasive.42 
                                                                                                                      
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 
275–76. The First Circuit in Chiaradio explicitly stated that section 2252A would have al-
lowed for multiple prosecutions. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. 
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. The 
First Circuit’s analysis of the two statutes was in response to the prosecution’s argument 
that if 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) allowed for multiple prosecutions then so should 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(A)(4)(B). See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. 
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. 
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275–76. 
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274–75; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 
155–56; United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 730 (5th Cir. 1995). 
40 Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 729. 
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274; Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 730. 
It is important to point out that Kimbrough was decided before the 1998 amendment to 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), when the statute stated that anyone caught with “three or more,” 
as opposed to “one or more,” illegal matters could be charged under the statute. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274; Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 723. 
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274; Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 723. 
After concluding that Kimbrough applied to the case at bar, the First Circuit stated, 
“[a]ccordingly, we hold that the plain language of section 2252(a)(4)(B) memorializes 
Congress’s intent . . . that one who simultaneously possesses a multitude of forbidden im-
ages at a single time and in a single place will have committed only a single offense.” 
Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274. 
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 Similarly in Polouizzi, the defendant was charged with eleven 
counts of possession under section 2252(a)(4)(B) after he was caught 
with thousands of illegal images spread across three non-networked 
hard drives.43 Because the hard drives were not networked, Polouizzi 
needed to physically carry the hard drives between the rooms, connect 
them to the computers, and transfer the files while the hard drives were 
connected.44 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that the defendant could only be charged with one crime under section 
2252(a)(4)(B), reasoning that there was no legislative intent for the 
statute to be used to prosecute a defendant multiple times based on the 
amount of illegal images he possessed.45 The Chiaradio court found Pol-
ouizzi particularly persuasive and noted that the prosecution was unable 
to distinguish Chiaradio’s scenario from Polouizzi’s.46 
 In her concurring opinion in Chiaradio, Chief Judge Lynch noted 
that she would have preferred a holding and analysis that was explicitly 
limited to the scenario in Chiaradio.47 Although Chief Judge Lynch 
agreed with the majority’s decision in the case, she disagreed with the 
extent of the analysis that the majority engaged in to reach their deci-
sion.48 Chief Judge Lynch argued that although the evidence of legisla-
tive intent for 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) was sparse, it was apparent 
that Congress did not intend for someone in Chiaradio’s position to be 
charged with multiple crimes based on the number of hard drives he 
possessed.49 Because there was enough evidence of legislative intent 
                                                                                                                      
43 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 146–48. 
Interestingly, Polouizzi was charged only with eleven counts of possession even though he 
in fact had thousands of illegal images and videos. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147–48. 
44 See Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147–48. 
45 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155–57. 
46 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155–56. The First Circuit stated 
that the government “labors to distinguish Polouizzi on the ground that, unlike in that case 
. . . [the government] has consistently argued the significance of dual computers in sepa-
rate rooms.” Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. 
47 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Lynch stated that 
she wrote separately “to say that in [her] view both the question presented and the analysis 
needed to resolve this question are narrow,” and that she “would postpone engaging in any 
broader analysis until a future case.” Id. 
48 Id. Chief Judge Lynch preferred a simpler analysis. Id. Unlike the majority, she be-
lieved that the legislative intent behind 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) was unclear. Id. 
4918 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). The 
majority noted that the name of the 1998 amending legislation to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 was 
labeled the “Zero Tolerance for Possession of Child Pornography.” Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 
274. This fact alone would cast some doubt on legislative intent, and the majority seemed 
to be aware of this fact, as shown by their statement that they “do not write on a pristine 
page.” Id. at 275. 
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that two hard drives did not constitute two separate offenses, Chief 
Judge Lynch would have preferred that the majority not look to Pol-
ouizzi or Kimbrough for support.50 Chief Judge Lynch ended her concur-
rence by highlighting the difficulty of applying the statute to different 
technological scenarios, especially where the sentence should be more 
severe.51 In particular, she noted how Chiaradio’s scenario would be 
different from a scenario where the defendant used multiple mediums, 
including more technologically advanced mediums such as cloud stor-
age, to access different illegal files from different sources.52 Although 
Chief Judge Lynch never explicitly stated that her opinion was moti-
vated by an awareness of the pitfalls that accompany judicial decisions 
involving technology and statutory interpretation, it was nevertheless 
implicit in her reasoning.53 
III. Judicial Problems with Technology and  
Legislative Solutions 
 Chief Judge Lynch’s restrained approach in United States v. Chiara-
dio would have been preferable because it highlighted the need for leg-
islative action in this area, and therefore promised greater protection 
for the constitutional rights of the accused and the safety of the general 
public.54 Chief Judge Lynch agreed with the majority that Chiaradio 
was being charged twice for the same crime in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment and that the case needed to be remanded.55 Nevertheless, 
in her concurring opinion, Chief Judge Lynch advocated a narrower 
analysis because it is unclear how the statute would apply to other sce-
                                                                                                                      
50 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring); Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 157; 
Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 730. 
51 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). It is worth noting that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252 does not use the words “hard drive,” “network,” or “Internet.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 
52 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring) (noting that it was not obvious 
that Congress intended to bar multiple counts in situations where the defendant used 
multiple technological mediums to access illegal files at different times and from different 
sources). 
53 See id. (noting that the court has “not received briefing on any legislative history of 
section 2252(a)(4)(B) which might clarify congressional intent on” the issue of how the 
statute would apply to mediums other than two networked hard drives). “This appeal pre-
sents a montage of issues arising at a crossroads where traditional criminal law principles 
intersect with the marvels of modern technology.” Id. at 270 (majority opinion). 
54 See United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 273–76 (1st Cir. 2012); id. at 285 
(Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
55 See id. at 276 (majority opinion); id. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
2013] Collision of Constitutional Rights, Technology, and Statutory Interpretation 9 
narios and because a broad precedent might unduly burden future 
courts.56 
 The majority’s deference to United States v. Polouizzi is problematic 
because of the fundamental difference in technology at issue in the two 
cases—Chiaradio dealt with networked hard drives whereas Polouizzi did 
not.57 Polouizzi needed to physically connect his external hard drives to 
his computer in order to access and archive the illegal images, but 
Chiaradio’s networked hard drives effectively functioned as a single 
unit.58 Furthermore, unlike Chiaradio, Polouizzi’s multiple charges 
were based not on the number of hard drives, but rather on the num-
ber of specific files.59 Despite these differences, the First Circuit never-
theless looked to Polouizzi, thereby linking it to Chiaradio and grouping 
together two technologies with notable differences.60 The First Circuit 
compared Chiaradio’s scenario to a situation where a defendant had 
multiple photo albums and swapped illegal pictures between them.61 
That comparison is more applicable to the non-networked external 
hard drives in Polouizzi than Chiaradio’s networked hard drives because 
Chiaradio never had to physically swap anything; instead he could ac-
cess his illegal files remotely from any device on his home network.62 If 
there is no legal distinction between the two technologies, this may 
mean that possession convictions depend on whether or not all of the 
files were accessed from a single house, regardless of the number of 
different mediums used to view explicit images.63 Furthermore, if the 
location is the common factor, this may mean that an individual has 
committed a separate crime of possession whenever he stores illegal 
files somewhere other than his home.64 Modern networked hard drives 
and computers, for example, can be configured so that their files can 
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
57 See id. (placing extra emphasis on the fact that the case at bar involved networked 
computers and stating that the majority should not have addressed Polouizzi). 
58 See id. at 271 (majority opinion); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 147 (2d 
Cir. 2009). 
59 Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 154. 
60 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275 (addressing networked hard drives that functioned as a 
single unit); Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147 (dealing with external hard drives that needed to be 
physically connected). The majority opinion stated that the holding was a narrow one, but 
it gave Polouizzi additional influence by relying on it. See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275 (stating 
that the government “labors to distinguish Polouizzi” from the case at bar). 
61 Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. 
62 See id.; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147. 
63 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
64 See id. 
10 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
be accessed from anywhere with an Internet connection.65 Because of 
the majority’s dubious decision to analogize a case concerning non-
networked hard drives to a case involving networked hard drives, future 
courts will now have to tackle the legal significance of the two tech-
nologies and untangle Chiaradio from Polouizzi in the process.66 
 Evolving technology presents a unique problem for courts because 
a well-informed ruling involving the application of an older statute to 
new technology requires a thorough understanding of the new tech-
nology.67 Although courts need to be technologically competent to 
avoid setting precedent that would unnecessarily harm the rights of the 
accused, they often lack the resources to attain such competence 
through research and education.68 Seemingly aware of this, Chief Judge 
Lynch highlighted the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is difficult to 
apply in modern scenarios.69 Chief Judge Lynch’s cautious approach is 
preferable because it minimizes opportunities to establish bad prece-
dent, and because it focuses on the entity that is best equipped to han-
dle the problem—the legislature.70 The legislature is in the best posi-
tion to determine how the law will apply to evolving technology due to 
its greater fact-finding capabilities relative to the judiciary.71 Congress’s 
resources and constitutional powers should allow it to become edu-
cated in the intricacies of network technology and create laws that will 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 276 (majority opinion) (relying on Polouizzi and holding that “the defen-
dant’s unlawful possession of a multitude of files on two interlinked computers located in 
separate rooms within the same dwelling gave rise to only a single count of unlawful pos-
session”). Networked hard drives behave more like the extension of a single entity in which 
there is no need to physically swap items. See id.; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147; see also Kerr, 
supra note 9, at 875–76 (noting that judges frequently struggle to understand new tech-
nologies, “and often must rely on the crutch of questionable metaphors to aid their com-
prehension”). 
67 See Kerr, supra note 9, at 875 (“The task of generating balanced and nuanced rules 
requires a comprehensive understanding of technological facts. Legislatures are well-
equipped to develop such understandings; courts generally are not.”). 
68 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring); Kerr, supra note 9, at 875. As 
Professor Kerr makes clear in A Case for Caution: “The information environment of judicial 
rulemaking is usually poor. Judges decide cases based primarily on a brief factual record, 
narrowly argued legal briefs, and a short oral argument. They must decide their cases in a 
timely fashion, and can put only so much effort into any one case.” Kerr, supra note 9, at 
875. 
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., con-
curring). 
70 See Kerr, supra note 9, at 875. 
71 See id. 
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adequately protect the constitutional rights of the accused.72 A final 
benefit of this cautious judicial approach is that it foregrounds the of-
ten overlooked constitutional issues that individuals in Chiaradio’s 
situation face.73 
 Additionally, it is possible that Congress would prefer for someone 
in Chiaradio’s position, harboring thousands of illegal files on two sepa-
rate networked hard drives, to face a harsher sentence than individuals 
who do not use technology to such extremes.74 Chiaradio employed 
technology that was even more sophisticated than the technology Pol-
ouizzi used, which arguably makes him more culpable than Polouizzi.75 
Chief Judge Lynch also alluded to the idea that perhaps Congress wants 
greater punishment for individuals that employ a wide array of tech-
nologies at different times to access child pornography.76 These are se-
rious public safety concerns that the legislature alone can remedy by 
using its institutional expertise and constitutional authority.77 
 The Chiaradio majority merely had to hold that the drafters of the 
statute did not intend for Chiaradio to be charged on two separate 
counts; in going beyond that, the majority perpetuated the belief that 
the judiciary alone can resolve such nuanced technological and statu-
tory issues.78 Because the First Circuit failed to even acknowledge that 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring) (lamenting the lack of addi-
tional facts provided because more information would be needed to clarify congressional 
intent on the issue); Kerr, supra note 9, at 875 (stating that “[l]egislative rules tend to be 
the product of a wide range of inputs, ranging from legislative hearings and poll results to 
interest group advocacy and backroom compromises”). 
73 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; 
or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give A Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 
1079, 1096–97 (1993) (stating that “when judges interpret language that bears on criminal 
procedure, they should acknowledge their singular responsibility to those who are unable 
to defend themselves through electoral politics”). 
74 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274–75; id. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). The amending 
legislation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) was called the “Zero Tolerance for Possession of 
Child Pornography,” which alone suggests that Congress intended the punishments under 
the statute to be harsh. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274–75 (ma-
jority opinion). This was also referenced throughout Chief Judge Lynch’s concurring opin-
ion. See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring) (“The question of Congres-
sional intent as to very different factual situations on single vs. multiple crimes strikes me 
as not being resolved by a plain reading of the statutory text.”). 
75 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 271 (describing the sophisticated system that Chiaradio 
used to download and archive illegal images); Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147. 
76 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring) (noting how perhaps Con-
gress does intend multiple convictions for an individual who uses various technological 
mediums to access illegal files from different sources). 
77 See Kerr, supra note 9, at 875. 
78 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275–76 (relying on Polouizzi and holding that “the defen-
dant’s unlawful possession of a multitude of files on two interlinked computers located in 
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the tension between dated statutes and new technology requires legisla-
tive attention, a comprehensive solution to the problem remains a dis-
tant hope.79 The Fifth Amendment protects all criminals, regardless of 
the crime, from being convicted twice for the same crime.80 Neverthe-
less, individuals like Chiaradio face the prospect of multiple punish-
ments for the same crime if a judge is unsure how section 
2252(a)(4)(B) applies to modern technology.81 It is also unfair to the 
victims of child pornography to punish an individual who uses broader 
and more sophisticated technologies than Chiaradio at the same level 
as Chiaradio.82 This nuanced issue can be settled only by the consid-
ered judgment of the legislature.83 Chief Judge Lynch understood that 
Chiaradio’s situation was not “resolved by a plain reading of the statu-
tory text,” and that the majority would have been wise to follow her ap-
proach and explicitly note that this area of the law requires legislative 
action.84 
Conclusion 
 The First Circuit in United States v. Chiaradio held that an individual 
who possesses thousands of illegal child pornography images across two 
networked hard drives has committed a single crime. Chief Judge 
Lynch wrote a concurring opinion that emphasized the statute’s ambi-
                                                                                                                      
separate rooms within the same dwelling gave rise to only a single count of unlawful pos-
session”); id. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring) (expressing concern over how the court’s 
interpretation of what constitutes “matter” under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) might impact 
future cases, and advocating for as narrow a holding as possible). “While other cases, on 
different facts, might appropriately give rise to multiple possession charges under section 
2252(a)(4)(B), the facts of this case do not support such an outcome.” Id. at 276 (majority 
opinion). 
79 See id. at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
80 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980) (stating that 
the Fifth Amendment “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense”); 
Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 273, 276 (rejecting the government’s argument that Chiaradio’s 
“utilization of two computers (the laptop and the desktop) exposed him to prosecution for 
two separate crimes” and holding that his “simultaneous convictions and sentences . . . 
violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy). 
81 See United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that hard drives are matters for purposes 
of section 2252(a)(4)(B)); Kerr, supra note 9, at 875. The most troublesome technology 
will likely be remote storage services, which automatically duplicate files on server farms 
miles away. See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). In fact, this was one of 
the technologies mentioned by Chief Judge Lynch as potentially troublesome for the stat-
ute. Id. 
82 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
83 See Kerr, supra note 9, at 875. 
84 See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 285 (Lynch, C.J., concurring); Kerr, supra note 9, at 875. 
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guity as applied to more complex and modern scenarios and called for 
greater restraint in the analysis so as to avoid creating dangerous 
precedent. The majority should have shown the same restraint in its 
analysis and not suggested that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is easily ap-
plicable to modern scenarios. Courts often struggle when determining 
how old statutes apply to new technology, and when the ambiguity of 
statutory interpretation places the constitutional rights of citizens at 
risk, courts should not hesitate to conscript the legislature in its search 
for clarity. This was especially critical for Chiaradio because, as an indi-
vidual accused of a heinous act, his rights will not be well represented 
before Congress. A deferential judicial opinion in Chiaradio would have 
been a powerful message to Congress that the ambiguity of section 
2252(a)(4)(B) endangers the defendant’s constitutional rights. It is 
also true, however, that Chiaradio did engage in a heinous act, and 
there is a possibility that the statute as applied to modern technology is 
not as powerful a deterrent as society would prefer. The legislature is 
best equipped to strike the appropriate balance between these two con-
flicting concerns, and the First Circuit in Chiaradio missed an opportu-
nity to call them to the legislature’s attention. 
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